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Affirmative	Action	and	Development : 	
The	Case	of	Bumiputera	Policy
Michiya	KAWAMURA＊
Abstract:
	 Since	independence,	Malaysian	government	has	implemented	both	affirmative	action	and	developmental	
policy.	Both	policies	are	similar	 in	 that	 the	government	has	 taken	a	strong	 initiative	 to	encourage	a	
targeted	group	or	 sector,	yet	different	 in	 that	 the	 former	has	been	conducted	at	 the	cost	of	overall	
economic	growth,	while	the	latter	aimed	at	economic	surge.	
	 In	order	 for	Bumiputera	policy	 to	be	succeeded,	 the	preferential	distribution	 to	Malays	should	be	
approved	by	other	ethnic	groups	and	additional	measures	should	be	 taken	to	raise	Malays’	skills	and	
abilities,	without	hampering	economy	growth.	However,	 it	has	rarely	been	successful.	A	more	viable	
alternative	would	have	been	to	select	the	second	most	promising	industries	where	there	are	many	Malays	
and	raised	their	abilities	there	to	move	into	more	promising	sectors.	
	 Now	that	Malays	have	become	richer	as	a	whole,	though	ethnic	disparity	still	remains,	more	indirect	
encouragement	of	Malays	is	needed.
Keywords : Affirmative	Action,	Malaysia,	Ethnicity,	Developmental	policy,	Bumiputera	policy
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1.	 Bumiputera	Policy	at	the	Turning	Point
	 Malaysia	is	a	multi-ethnic	society	composed	of	Bumiputera1）	(Malays	and	other	indigenous	people)	65.9%,	
Chinese	25.3%,	Indians	7.5%,	and	others	1.3%	in	2005	(Ninth	Malaysia	Plan:	238).	Historically,	Bumiputera	
policy,	a	kind	of	affirmative	action,	has	been	implemented	with	 the	aim	of	 improving	Malays’	economic	
disadvantage	compared	to	Chinese	and	Indians.2）	It	is	a	peculiar	type	of	affirmative	action	in	that	Malays	rule	
politically	but	need	to	be	supported	economically.
	 However,	there	are	many	countries	like	this	across	the	world.	Though	indigenous	people	have	the	political	
power	in	many	post-colonial	Asian	and	African	countries,	European	residents	still	lead	the	national	economy,	
and	Chinese	and	Indian	immigrants	transferred	as	labourers	by	Europeans	enjoy	higher	living	standards	than	
indigenous	people.	Most	 indigenous	people	except	 for	a	 few	political	 leaders	 remain	poor	and	socially	
excluded.	Under	these	circumstances,	an	affirmative	action	like	Bumiputera	policy	can	be	a	principal	measure	
to	address	the	problem.
	 There	are	many	positive	and	negative	comments	on	Bumiputera	policy.	Some	praise	it	for	having	corrected	
economic	disparity	using	strong	leadership,	without	any	major	ethnic	riots	as	have	occurred	in	present	Britain	
and	France	(Suzuki	2010;	Ye	2003).	Yet	others	criticize	it	for	having	strengthened	the	authoritarian	regime	
advantageous	for	Malays	while	paying	little	attention	to	political	and	social	fairness	among	ethnic	groups	
(Jomo	1986;	Munro-kua	1996;	Means	1996).
	 Recently,	even	Malays	have	come	to	think	of	revising	the	policy.	The	former	Prime	Minister	Mahathir	bin	
Mohammad,	once	a	strong	promoter	of	 the	policy,	admitted	 that	 it	ended	 in	 failure	as	 it	made	Malays	
dependent	on	the	government	and	thus	remaining	poor	and	less	competitive	than	Chinese	and	Indians	(New	
Straits	Times,	August	7,	2002).	The	present	Prime	Minister	Najib	Razak	also	suggested	a	gradual	diminishing	
of	the	policy	for	fear	that	redistribution	with	preference	given	to	a	specific	group	would	distort	the	market’s	
efficiency	and	render	Malaysia	 incompetent	 in	 the	world	economy	(Damondaran	2009).	However,	 if	a	
loosening	of	the	policy	were	actually	implemented,	many	Malays	would	raise	objections,3）	fearing	that	they	
would	fall	into	poverty	again	because	of	their	poor	job,	research	and	management	skills.	
	 Has	Bumiputera	policy	been	an	adequate	measure	to	correct	economic	disparity	after	all?	What	should	be	
done	with	it	in	the	future?	In	order	to	answer	these	questions,	this	article	describes	how	Bumiputera	policy	has	
worked	in	modern	Malaysian	history.
 1）	 Bumiputera	means	‘sons	of	soil’	and	includes	many	indigenous	people	such	as	the	Orang	Asli	in	Peninsular	Malaysia,	the	Kazadan	in	Saba	and	
the	Iban	in	Sarawak	in	addition	to	Malays,	who	constitute	most	of	the	Bumiputera	population.
 2）	 The	government	sets	its	main	target	on	Malays,	taking	little	care	of	other	Bumiputera.
 3）	 The	Malay	Consultative	Council,	an	alliance	of	NGOs	led	by	the	independent	parliament	member	Ibrahim	Ali,	adopted	a	resolution	calling	for	
continuing	Bumiputera	policy	and	met	with	Prime	Minister	Najib	to	appeal	for	it	(Onozawa	2010:	58).
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2.	 What	is	Affirmative	Action?
	 Affirmative	action	means	preferential	 treatment	for	members	of	an	economically	disadvantaged	group,	
mainly	by	giving	them	special	quotas	for	entering	university,	obtaining	employment	and	undertaking	public	
projects	if	they	run	a	company.	
	 Some	criticize	affirmative	action	because	it	aims	at	group	equality,	which	is	often	harmful	to	individual	
rights.4）	Chandran	Kukathas	says	group	equality	brings	about	the	improper	situation	in	which	a	poor	person	
cannot	be	supported	just	because	he	belongs	to	a	rich	group,	while	a	rich	person	can	receive	assistance	just	
because	he	belongs	 to	a	poor	group	(Kukathas	1992:	123).	Group	 treatments,	however,	are	sometimes	
required	to	promote	equal	opportunities	among	individuals.
	 Institutional	protection	for	 individual	 liberty	and	equality	 is	not	enough	for	 life	 to	be	sustained.	Social	
capitals5）	are	indispensable,	including	respect	for	rights	and	personalities,	circumstances	in	which	people	can	
afford	to	develop	basic	skills,	knowledge	and	common	sense,	disclosure	of	important	information	and	social	
networks	helpful	to	hedge	risks	in	social	life.	However,	some	groups	lack	in	them	because	they	have	been	too	
culturally	discriminated	 to	have	opportunities	 to	develop	 them	(Clark	1965).	Because	social	capitals	are	
different	from	normal	capitals	in	that	they	are	socially	shared	and	not	to	be	obtained	by	individuals,	they	must	
be	compensated	to	disadvantaged	groups	as	a	whole.
	 The	most	serious	problem	suffered	by	culturally	discriminated	groups	is	a	vicious	cycle	between	their	lack	
of	opportunities	and	bad	reputation.	Members	of	a	discriminated	group	have	such	few	opportunities	that	they	
are	 less	equipped	with	skills,	knowledge	and	competitive	minds.	Thereby,	a	 ‘statistical	discrimination’	
appears.	It	is	not	statistically	wrong	to	regard	most	of	them	as	lacking	skills	and	knowledge	just	because	they	
belong	 to	 the	group,	so	people	often	neglect	 looking	at	who	individuals	 in	 the	group	really	are.	 In	 turn,	
members	of	 the	disadvantaged	group	are	 likely	 to	give	up	studying	and	training	because	 they	can	see	 in	
advance	that	others	will	not	recognize	 their	abilities	as	an	individual.	This,	 in	 turn,	makes	 the	group	less	
competent,	and	statistical	discrimination	is	strengthened.6）	
	 In	order	 to	avoid	 this	 situation,	 they	must	be	given	opportunities,	encouraged	 to	develop	skills	and	
knowledge	and	helped	 to	change	 the	reputation	of	 their	group	as	a	whole.	Special	quotas	on	admission,	
employment	and	contracts	are	supposed	to	be	effective	for	 this	purpose.	However,	as	 long	as	affirmative	
action	is	taken	from	an	individualistic	viewpoint,	 limitations	must	be	imposed.	When	the	reputation	of	the	
 4）	 Some	liberal	theorists	approve	of	affirmative	action	as	long	as	it	helps	to	promote	equal	opportunities	among	individuals	(Dworkin	1977:	239;	
Kymlicka	1996:	142).	Other	 liberals	disapprove	on	 the	grounds	 that	disparity	should	be	corrected	 from	an	 individualistic	viewpoint	
considering	income,	age	and	physical	handicaps,	regardless	of	group	membership	(Barry	2001:12-13).
 5）	 Bourdieu	defines	this	concept	as	“the	aggregate	of	the	actual	or	potential	resources	which	are	linked	to	possession	of	a	durable	network	of	more	
or	less	institutionalized	relationships	of	mutual	acquaintance	or	recognition”	(Bourdieu	1985:	248),	and	Baker	defines	it	as	“a	resource	that	
actors	derive	from	specific	social	structures	and	then	use	to	pursue	their	interest”	(Baker	1990:	619).
 6）	 Fryer,	Goeree	and	Holt	(2005)	show	that	this	vicious	cycle	actually	happened	in	their	classroom	experiment.
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group	improves	and	statistical	discrimination	diminishes	to	a	certain	level,	preferential	treatments	should	be	
gradually	diminished.	
	 It	is	important	to	note	that	preferential	treatments	do	not	always	improve	skills	and	knowledge	effectively	
(Holzer	and	Neumark	2000:	558).	There	are	two	significant	conditions	for	such	improvements.
	 First,	the	scale	and	context	of	preferential	treatments	should	be	appropriate.	If	a	treatment	is	too	preferential	
to	the	ethnic	minority,	the	group	comes	to	rely	on	it	so	much	that	they	cannot	study	or	work	eagerly	or	will	not	
run	their	companies	with	serious	risk-taking	(Bates	and	Williams	1996).	A	proper	scale	of	treatment	must	be	
found	such	 that	 the	group	 is	neither	 spoiled	nor	neglected.7）	Furthermore,	 special	 treatment	 should	be	
approved	by	other	ethnic	groups.	Without	stable	political	circumstances	and	economic	growth,	they	cannot	
easily	make	a	compromise	on	quotas.	In	a	depression,	they	are	apt	to	be	discontent	with	the	burden	they	have	
to	bear	to	treat	other	groups	preferentially,	but	in	an	economic	boom,	the	total	growth	of	the	economy	will	
compensate	for	the	burden,	and	they	will	not	have	to	protest	(Tobin	1965).
	 Second,	preferential	 treatments	need	to	be	followed	by	certain	kinds	of	social	cooperation	to	effectively	
counter	the	disadvantages	minorities	face.	Minority	students	who	are	given	admission	priority	are	likely	to	fail	
in	class	and	feel	 inferior	 if	 they	are	not	supported	after	entering	a	university.	The	same	can	happen	in	the	
workplace.	In	order	to	avoid	these	failures,	special	classes	are	needed	for	minorities	to	improve	their	academic	
achievement,	and	their	skillfulness	should	be	checked	periodically	in	the	workplace	(Holzer	and	Neumark	
2000:	558).	
	 Social	cooperation	is	also	needed	to	support	lower	members	who	do	not	directly	benefit	from	preferential	
treatments.	Entering	university	and	obtaining	employment	under	special	quotas	are	confined	to	 the	upper	
members	of	the	group	(Fishkin	1983).	However,	there	are	still	some	role	model	effects.	Mahathir	said,	‘With	
the	existence	of	the	few	rich	Malays	at	least	the	poor	Malays	can	say	that	their	fate	is	not	entirely	to	serve	the	
rich	non-Malays’	(Mahathir	2008:	63).	Yet	the	role	model	effect	cannot	work	well	unless	there	is	a	social	bond	
between	the	rich	and	poor.	Without	it,	the	poor	often	suspect	that	the	upper	members	will	abandon	their	group	
after	they	achieve	economic	success	(Austen-Smith	and	Fryer	2005).	However,	if	there	is	a	tight	bond,	and	
these	upper	members	return	to	their	group,	 they	can	serve	as	role	models,	 teach	skills	and	knowledge	and	
provide	jobs	if	they	have	established	firms	in	the	area.8）
	 After	all,	affirmative	action	should	not	end	with	 treating	minorities	preferentially.	A	certain	scale	of	
redistribution	that	 is	effective	to	develop	the	abilities	of	disadvantaged	members	and	acceptable	for	other	
ethnic	groups,	and	certain	kinds	of	social	cooperation	including	continuous	support	after	redistribution	and	
tight	bond	between	the	upper	and	lower	members	of	the	minority	group	are	indispensable.
 7）	 But	referring	to	Fryer	and	Loury	(2005:149),	this	accommodation	is	rather	difficult.
 8）	 In	addition,	they	can	bridge	the	cultural	border.	See	Granovetter	(1973)	and	Putnam’s	definition	of	bridging	social	capital	(Putnam	2000:	22).
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3.	 Affirmative	Action	and	Developmental	Policy
	 If	economically	supported	people	are	rather	dominant	 in	politics,	as	 in	Malaysia,	how	does	 this	affect	
affirmative	action?	
	 Political	dominance	is	helpful	 to	meet	the	two	conditions	mentioned	above.	Political	power	enables	the	
economically	disadvantaged	 to	 take	 the	 initiative	 to	reach	an	agreement	on	 the	scale	and	 the	method	of	
affirmative	action	among	different	groups.	And	with	their	political	dominance,	the	disadvantaged	can	afford	to	
form	various	political	and	social	support	for	affirmative	action	to	be	more	effective.	
	 Yet	political	dominance	is	also	unfavourable	for	meeting	these	conditions.	The	dominant	group	has	such	
freedom	to	set	the	scale	of	preferential	treatments	that	they	could	even	abandon	serious	efforts	to	accumulate	
skills	and	knowledge.	Also,	affirmative	action	is	often	affected	by	other	policies	because	dominant	ethnic	
elites	have	to	implement	both	at	the	same	time.	If	they	fail	to	fulfil	other	policies	by	concentrating	solely	on	
affirmative	action,	 their	 leadership	becomes	unreliable	and	the	political	situation	unstable.	It	also	becomes	
difficult	for	them	to	set	a	proper	scale	of	preferential	treatment	and	to	take	effective	aftercare	of	it.	Thus,	it	is	
necessary	 to	clarify	 the	 relations	between	affirmative	action	and	other	policies.	Among	 these	policies,	
developmental	policy	is	the	most	important.	
	 This	type	of	policy,	supposedly	effective	to	catch	up	with	developed	countries,	has	been	adopted	by	many	
East	Asian	countries	including	South	Korea,	Taiwan,	Singapore,	Indonesia	and	Malaysia.	It	is	a	policy	such	
that	a	state	powerful	enough	to	suppress	 the	freedom	of	 its	citizens	sets	economic	development	as	a	 top	
priority	and	takes	positive	measures	to	encourage	it	(Johnson	1982;	Haggard	1990;	Murakami	1992).9）
	 Developmental	states	do	not	believe	that	free	market	is	the	best	way	to	develop	economic	growth.	They	
protect	and	promote	specific	industries	or	corporations	until	they	become	fully	competitive	in	the	market.10）	
The	industries	are	those	that	have	the	potential	to	grow	rapidly	in	the	future	or	are	technology-oriented,	taking	
charge	of	diffusing	their	inventions	to	the	many	affiliated	sectors	that	they	lead.	
	 However,	this	leads	to	a	dilemma	between	economic	growth	and	social	stability.	An	opportunistic	claim	often	
arises,	which	states	 that	 the	government	should	 immediately	redistribute	 the	outcome	of	growth	without	
reinvesting	it	because	the	nation	can	hardly	wait	for	the	larger	profit	the	reinvestment	will	bring	in	the	future.	
According	to	Huntington	and	Nelson	(1976),	if	elites	implement	developmental	policy	boldly	without	paying	
much	attention	 to	human	rights	or	 free	elections,	 the	 result	will	be	a	prosperous	economy	with	social	
instability	because	 the	outcomes	of	development	are	not	widely	or	equally	distributed	 to	 the	people	(the	
technocratic	model).	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	government	allows	its	people	generous	political	participation,	it	
 9）	 Concerning	this	point,	it	is	often	said	that	efficient	bureaucratic	technocrats	autonomous	from	specific	interests	took	an	important	role	(Johnson	
1982;	Haggard	1990;	Murakami	1992).
10）	 Details	of	industrial	policies	implemented	in	East	Asia	NIEs	are	shown	in	Vogel	(1991).	Japanese	industrial	policy	is	intensively	studied	in	
Komiya,	Okuno	and	Suzumura	(1984).
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can	maintain	social	 stability	because	 the	people’s	claims	will	be	addressed,	but	 it	cannot	maintain	 the	
consistency	of	its	policies	needed	for	economic	growth	(the	populist	model).	
	 In	order	to	avoid	this	dilemma,	developmental	states	must	carry	out	two	different	redistribution	policies	
(Evans	1995;	Trezzini	2001).	One	is	growth-oriented	irrespective	of	particularistic	interests,	and	the	other	is	
rather	conciliatory	 in	 that	 the	state,	having	a	channel	 to	hear	and	respond	 to	 the	people’s	claims,	 takes	
measures	 to	diminish	 the	gap	between	 the	 rich	and	poor	by	promoting	education	across	 the	country,	
improving	rural	infrastructures,	carrying	out	paternalistic	labour	protection	and	redistributing	the	outcome	of	
growth	to	people	in	low	growth	industries	(Campos	and	Loot	1996).	The	sole	aim	of	these	measures	is	 to	
maintain	social	stability;	 thus,	modernization	of	 the	low-growth	sectors	 is	not	fully	attained,	and	citizens’	
claims	are	often	suppressed	if	they	represent	the	possibility	of	disturbances.	
	 Developmental	policy	is	not	always	successful.11）	Targeted	industries	may	be	mistakenly	selected	by	the	
government	 and	may	 consequently	 consume	 investments	 in	 vain.	Developmental	 policy	 should	be	
implemented	only	if	state	intervention	is	surely	regarded	as	more	effective	than	the	market	in	that	the	targeted	
industries	can	be	clearly	specified,	and	the	market	by	itself	cannot	organize	the	collaboration	of	many	firms	
for	large	research	and	investment.	Though	it	is	often	difficult	or	even	impossible	to	judge	correctly	whether	
developmental	policy	is	effective,	it	is	comparatively	easy	in	a	case	such	as	the	‘flying	geese	pattern’	in	East	
Asia,	in	which	Japan	runs	first,	new	industrial	economies	such	as	South	Korea,	Taiwan	and	Singapore	come	
next,	and	Thailand,	Malaysia	and	Indonesia	follow	them	(Akamatsu	1962).	According	 to	 the	production	
theory12）	 that	Vernon	(1966)	popularised,	 ‘As	 the	product	matures	and	its	production	 technology	become	
routine,	marketing	and	production	costs—largely	materials,	capital	and	unskilled	labour—become	crucial	in	
cost	calculation,	and	consequently	 its	production	site	 is	 likely	 to	be	shifted	outside	 its	national	 territory’	
(Kasahara	2004).	However,	the	more	a	developing	country	catches	up	with	developed	ones,	the	more	difficult	
it	is	to	select	the	next	target.	Therefore,	developmental	policy	should	be	regarded	as	a	transitional	measure,	
and	the	state	should	gradually	yield	the	role	of	encouraging	development	to	the	market.	
	 Developmental	policy	resembles	affirmative	action	in	that	 the	state	takes	a	positive	role	to	encourage	a	
certain	industry	or	ethnic	group.	It	 is	not	necessarily	impossible	for	the	developmental	state,	having	a	wide	
range	of	discretionary	powers,	to	manage	to	carry	out	both	policies	consistently.	If	affirmative	action	succeeds	
in	correcting	economic	disparity	and	leading	to	political	stability	as	a	result,	 it	will	also	contribute	 to	 the	
implementation	of	developmental	policy.	
	 However,	 these	policies	do	not	always	strengthen	each	other.	Affirmative	action	and	promoting	part	of	
developmental	policy	have	essentially	different	targets.	The	latter	tries	to	accumulate	capital	and	technology	
11）	 Many	economists	admit	the	effectiveness	of	the	East	Asian	industrial	policy,	but	they	are	still	skeptical	of	the	protection	of	a	specific	industrial	
sector	by	government	(World	Bank	1993;	World	Bank	1997).
12）	 However,	there	is	an	argument	that	“the	experience	of	the	Southeast	Asian	economies	has	been	very	different	from	that	predicted	by	product	
cycle	theory”	(Bernard	and	Ravenhill	1995).
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in	promising	 sectors,	while	 the	 former	 tries	 to	develop	 the	 skills,	 knowledge	and	credibility	of	 the	
disadvantaged	ethnic	group,	usually	 in	 less	developed	sectors.	Affirmative	action	 is	also	different	 from	
conciliatory	part	of	developmental	policy,	because	 the	 latter	 aims	not	 so	positively	at	promoting	 the	
disadvantaged	group	as	the	former,	only	trying	to	weaken	the	discontent	of	the	disadvantaged.	Thus,	unless	
these	demarcations	are	properly	recognized,	affirmative	action	 is	 likely	 to	resonate	with	 the	conciliatory	
policy	and	become	a	measure	to	protect	the	vested	interest	of	the	disadvantaged.	
	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	for	Malays	to	maintain	the	essence	of	affirmative	action	firmly	without	being	
affected	by	conciliatory	policies	so	that	 they	may	use	their	political	power	effectively	to	correct	economic	
disparity.	
4.	 Malaysia’s	Experience
(1)	From	Independence	to	the	May	13	Incident
	 The	constitution	of	Malaysia,13）	established	shortly	after	independence,	includes	articles	that	refer	to	the	
Malays’	political	dominance	and	economic	disadvantage.	Their	dominant	status	is	confirmed	by	Article	3,	
which	recognizes	Islam	as	the	state	religion,	Article	32,	which	states	that	the	supreme	head	of	the	state	shall	
be	elected	from	among	sultans,	and	Article	152,	which	establishes	Malay	as	 the	national	 language.	The	
correction	of	economic	disparity	among	ethnic	groups	is	prescribed	in	Article	153,	which	states	that	Malays	
shall	be	given	quotas	on	positions	in	civil	service,	public	scholarships	and	business	licences.	The	article	also	
prohibits	the	deprivation	of	any	non-Malays’	rights.	Thus,	the	first	Prime	Minister	Abdul	Rahman	(in	office	
1957-1970)	did	not	carry	out	redistribution	for	Malays	that	was	so	lavish	as	to	distort	free	market	economy,	
and	his	period	in	office	was	approximately	characterized	as laissez-faire (Jesudason	1989:	47).	
	 While	tin,	rubber	and	wood	products	had	been	leading	industries	for	a	long	time	in	Malaysia,	Malaysia	began	
to	promote	manufacturing	before	other	East	Asian	countries.	As	a	result,	manufacturing	surpassed	agriculture	
in	the	mid-1980s	(Table	1).	At	first,	import-substituting	industries	such	as	textile	and	food	processing	began	to	
develop	with	the	support	of	the	Pioneer	Industries	Ordinance	(1958)	and	the	Pioneer	Industries	Act	(1965),	
which	encouraged	the	founding	of	new	companies.
	 Throughout	the	1960s,	the	Malaysian	economy	recorded	an	average	annual	growth	rate	of	5.98%	(Figure	1),	
slightly	higher	than	other	East	Asian	countries	in	the	same	period.	This	was	because	capital-intensive	foreign	
manufacturers	and	small-to-medium	Chinese	companies	that	engaged	in	wholesales,	construction	and	finance	
performed	well	in	the	laissez-faire	economy	(Jesudason	1989:	62-4).
13）	 The	constitution	prescribes	almost	as	many	details	as	law	in	Malaysia	because	more	authoritative	and	compulsory	rule	than	law	is	required	for	
uniting	different	ethnic	groups	into	a	nation.
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Figure 1. Growth Rate of GDP 1961-70
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Figure 2. Inter-Ethnic Income Ratio
Source: calculated from MP9, p.11, MP4, p.53, MP5, p.99, MTR9, p58. 2.29 2.21 2.28
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Table 1. Gross domestic product by industry of origin (%)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Agriculture,	 forestry,	 livestock	 and	
fishing
38 34 33.6 32.5 22.2 20.8 18.7 10.3 8.7 8.2
Mining	and	quarrying 6 5 7.2 5.4 4.6 10.4 9.7 8.2 6.6 6.7
Manufacturing 9 11 12.8 19.3 20.5 19.7 27.0 27.1 33.4 31.4
Construction 3 5 3.8 4.4 4.5 4.8 3.5 4.4 3.3 2.7
Electricity,	gas	and	water 1 2 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.7 1.9 3.5 3.4 4.1
Transport,	storage	and	communications 4 3 3.8 7.2 6.5 6.4 6.9 7.4 8.0 8.8
Wholesale	 and	 retail	 trade,	 hotel	 and	
restaurants
16 16 13.7 15.0 12.6 12.1 11.0 15.2 14.9 14.7
finance,	 insurance,	 real	 estate	 and	
business	services
1 2 2.0 9.9 8.2 9.0 9.7 10.4 11.8 15.1
Government	services n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.9 13.0 12.2 10.7 7.1 7.0 7.6
n.a.:	not	available
Sources:	 Government	of	Malaysia.	First Malaysia Plan	(MP1).	p.37;	MP2.	p.31;	MP4.	p.11;	MP6.	p.20;	MP8.	p.35;	
MP9.	p.50;	Mid-term Review of third Malaysia Plan	(MTR3).	p.3;	MTR6.	p.28.
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	 Although	the	Malays’	employment	rate	improved	with	the	progress	of	industrialization,14）	their	income	level	
remained	low.	The	Chinese/Bumiputera	income	ratio	was	around	2.1%	(Figure	2).	The	number	of	new	firms	
founded	by	Malays	was	still	 lower	 than	that	by	Chinese	and	Indians.	Thus,	economic	disparity	remained	
largely	unchanged	in	this	period.	
	 Most	affirmative	measures	were	carried	out	only	in	education.	The	United	Malays	National	Organization	
(UMNO),	the	leading	party	of	the	ruling	coalition,	emphasized	that	Malays	should	occupy	leading	positions	in	
public	sectors.	In	addition	to	admission	and	scholarship	quotas	for	Malays,	the	UMNO	tried	to	make	Malay	
the	dominant	language	in	public	education	so	that	Malays	could	survive	severe	competition	to	obtain	public	
positions	(Ishii	1999:	52-3).	It	should	be	noted	here	that	not	skills	and	knowledge	obtained	in	school,	but	the	
academic	career	 itself	was	crucial	(Ishii	1999:	53).	Thus,	 these	measures	did	not	raise	Malays’	economic	
performance,	but	ended	in	securing	their	political	positions.	In	this	atmosphere,	the	government	decided	in	
1962	that	only	Malay	and	English	were	permitted	as	languages	of	instruction	from	middle	school	onward,	and	
Chinese	and	Tamil	could	be	used	only	in	elementary	school.	
	 Malays,	Chinese	and	Indians,	except	for	those	in	the	upper	class,	grew	discontent	with	this	system.	Chinese	
and	Indians	were	losing	positions	in	education	and	politics	that	were	crucial	for	their	cultural	identities,	while	
Malays	could	not	develop	their	skills,	knowledge	and	income	with	all	their	political	prestige.	
	 The	growing	discontent	was	reflected	in	 the	outcome	of	 the	1969	general	election,	 in	which	the	ruling	
coalition,	 including	 the	UMNO,	Malaysian	Chinese	Association	 (MCA)	 and	Malaysian	 Indian	
Congress	(MIC),	was	defeated	with	less	than	two	thirds	of	the	total	seats15）	(Table	2).	Taking	advantage	of	this	
result,	opposition	supporters	marched	 in	demonstration	 for	 the	expansion	of	non-Malay	rights,	and	 the	
UMNO	supporters’	hostility	also	grew	in	response.	Eventually,	the	most	disastrous	ethnic	riot	in	Malaysian	
history	broke	out	on	13	May	1969.
14）	 Malays’	employment	rate	for	total	population	rose	from	48.2%	in	1957	to	51.8%	in	1970	Ishii	1999:	48).
15）	 The	constitution	of	Malaysia,	which	prescribes	more	details	than	ordinary	constitutions,	has	to	be	revised	frequently.	Because	more	than	two-
thirds	approval	is	required	for	constitutional	revision,	it	is	crucial	whether	ruling	parties	can	gain	this	number	of	seats	in	the	election.	Ruling	
parties	have	been	successful	except	for	in	1969	and,	most	recently,	in	2008.
Table 2. Seats in Parliament by leading political parties
1959＊ 1964＊ 1969 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1995 1999 2004 2008
Ruling	Parties	(%) 71.2 85.6
64.1
(63.6)#
87.7 84.4 85.7 85.5 70.6 84.4 76.7 90.4 63.1
UMNO 52 59 51 61 69 70 83 71 89 72 109 79
MCA 19 27 13 19 17 24 17 18 30 28 31 15
MIC 3 3 2 4 3 4 6 6 7 7 9 3
PAS 13 9 12 14 5 5 1 7 7 27 7 23
DAP ― 1 13 9 16 9 24 20 9 10 12 28
PKR ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― 5 1 31
	＊	 The	Parliament	elections	were	held	only	in	Peninsular	Malaysia	in	1959	and	1964.
	#	 	The	elections	 in	Saba	and	Sarawak	were	postponed	 to	1970	because	of	 the	May	13	 incident	 in	 the	peninsula.	The	figure	 in	
parentheses	is	the	total	result	including	Saba	and	Sarawak.
Source:	Washida	(2008:	174-6).
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(2)	New	Economic	Policy	(NEP)	before	Mahathir	administration	
	 Abdul	Razak,	 inaugurated	as	 the	second	Prime	Minister	shortly	after	 the	riot,	began	 to	force	rigorous	
preferential	treatments	for	Malays	instead	of	conceding	to	non-Malays.	He	took	equality	of	living	standard	
more	seriously	than	the	cultural	and	symbolic	equality	Chinese	and	Indians	demanded.
	 For	 this	purpose,	 the	NEP	was	established	 in	1971	with	 the	following	goals:	 (1)	 to	correct	economic	
imbalance	so	as	 to	reduce	the	 identification	of	race	with	economic	function	and	(2)	 to	eradicate	poverty,	
irrespective	of	race	(Mid-Term	Review	of	Second	Malaysia	Plan:	I).	The	NEP,	especially	goal	(1),	meant	that	
affirmative	action	began	to	be	seriously	implemented	in	the	economy	as	well	as	in	education.	
	 However,	the	NEP	had	limited	effects.	Its	most	salient	aspect	was	not	the	raising	of	skills	and	knowledge,	but	
the	restructuring	of	wealth	ownership.	For	example,	the	Industrial	Coordination	Act	(ICA),	enacted	in	1975,	
prescribed	that	every	manufacturing	firm	must	obtain	a	government	licence	and	aimed	at	supporting	Malay	
businesses	and	employment	by	giving	 them	preferential	 licences.	Above	all,	 the	 ICA	stated	 that	a	new	
company	should	not	be	founded	without	30%	of	its	share	being	held	by	Malays	(including	government	trust	
agencies	and	state	enterprises16）),	and	Malays	were	also	targeted	to	own	at	least	30%	of	total	corporate	capital	
by	1990.	Emphasizing	wealth	ownership	sometimes	caused	 the	 ‘Ali	Baba’	phenomena;	 that	 is,	Malays	
without	 sufficient	management	skills	nominally	owned	companies	 that	were	actually	administrated	by	
Chinese.	
	 The	government	paid	little	attention	to	promoting	promising	indigenous	companies,	as	other	developmental	
states	in	East	Asia	did.	Import-substituting	industries	such	as	textile	and	food	processing	had	matured,	and	
electric	machinery,17）	 the	 leading	export	 industry,	had	begun	to	flourish	with	foreign	firms	in	Free	Trade	
Zones18）	(Table	3).	Malaysian	firms	outside	the	zones	had	little	linkage	with	foreign	manufacturers,19）	and	high	
technology	was	confined	in	the	zones	(Bernard	and	Ravenhill	1995:	206).	One	presumed	reason	for	this	is	that	
good	linkage	would	be	profitable	only	for	Chinese	enterprises	that	had	already	been	equipped	with	a	certain	
level	of	technology	and	management,	and	it	would	broaden	the	gap	between	Malays	and	Chinese	(Fong	1990:	
176).
	 Because	foreign	enterprises	had	continuously	been	a	dominant	factor	of	economic	growth	since	the	1960s,	
Malays’	acquisition	of	foreign	firms	based	on	the	ICA	proceeded	cautiously	so	as	not	to	hinder	growth.	Most	
foreign	corporations	bought	out	were	 in	 labour-intensive	 sectors	 such	as	production	and	sales	of	 raw	
commodities	like	Sime	Darby	or	in	government-affiliated	sectors	such	as	construction	and	finance	(Jesudason	
1989:	91-2).	Foreign	manufacturers	were	excluded	from	the	 target	because	 they	were	more	suitable	 than	
16）	 PERNAS	and	PNB	are	well-known	examples	of	governmental	holding	companies.
17）	 Electrical	Machinery	expanded	from	1.1%	of	industrial	value	added	in	1963	to	10.9%	in	1978	and	21.1%	in	1986	(Fong	1990:	153).	The	Inves
tment	Incentive	Act	(IIA)	passed	in	1968	prompted	this	expansion.
18）	 The	Free	Trade	Zones	Act	was	legislated	in	1971.
19）	 According	to	a	survey	of	167	large	firms	in	1985,	the	second	highest	reason	for	not	offering	subcontracting	to	small	firms	is	“lack	of	quality”	
(16.9%),	next	to	“sufficient	self-production	capacity”	(25.4%)(Fong	1990:	176).
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Malays	for	controlling	technology-intensive	industries.	This	was	overall	a	wise	judgment,	but	also	unwise	in	
that	billions	of	dollars	were	spent	to	buy	slow-growth	sectors	(Jesudason	1989:	98).	The	acquisition	of	foreign	
firms,	 though	unhelpful	 to	develop	Malays’	skills	and	knowledge,	contributed	to	 the	 increase	of	Malays’	
income	and	created	positions	for	new	officials	managing	public	enterprises.	It	mitigated	the	fears	of	Malay	
economic	marginality	(Jesudason	1989:	97).
	 In	education,	affirmative	action	was	strengthened	without	succeeding	much	 in	developing	skills	and	
knowledge.	 In	1977,	 in	public	education	from	middle	school	onward,	 instruction	 languages	began	 to	be	
integrated	 into	Malay,	 and	 it	was	 fully	accomplished	 in	1980.	However,	 this	did	not	bring	 sufficient	
accumulation	of	knowledge	based	on	 the	Malay	 language.	The	government	 established	 the	National	
Translation	Agency	to	proceed	with	the	translation	of	books	from	English	or	other	languages	into	Malay,	but	
‘Unfortunately,	the	translation	process	progressed	at	a	slow	pace’	(Gill	2005:	252).	Among	the	books,	science	
textbooks	were	the	most	serious	matter.	Most	of	those	translated	in	Malay	could	not	correctly	deliver	English	
textual	usage	and	expressions	(Sugimoto	2005:	91).	Thus,	 the	 traditional	situation	remained	 that	Malay	
students	were	inclined	to	succeed	in	the	humanities	and	social	sciences	while	Chinese	and	Indians	students	
took	to	the	natural	sciences.	
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	 Source:	Department	of	Statistics	of	Malaysia
Figure 3. Growth Rate of GDP 1971-80
Table 3. Exports of major commodities (%)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Food 6.3＊ 6.4 3.6 4.3 4.3 4.4 1.7 2.0
Rubber 33.4　 21.9 16.4 7.5 3.8 2.2 0.7 1.0
Tin 19.6　 13.1 8.9 4 1.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Crude	oil	and	petroleum	products 6.9　 10.5 24.5 25.6 14.8 4.9 5.8 8.4
Timber	and	timber-based	products 16.3　 11.4 13.5 10.3 8.9 5.4 2.7 2.1
Machinery 1.6＊ 6.2 11.5 18.7 35.7 55.1 62.5 54.0
＊provisional	figures	of	1971
Sources:	Department	of	Statistics	Malaysia.	Yearbook of Statistics Malaysia (YSM) 1971.	p.39,	41;	YSM1978.	
p.49,	51-3;	YSM1982.	p.24,	26-8;	YSM1985.	p.190,	192,	195-6;	YSM1993.	p.156,	165-8;	YSM1998.	
p.167,	176-8;	YSM2003.	p.192,	201-3;	YSM2008.	p.189,	197-8.
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	 English	was	still	the	most	important	language	in	the	workplace	because	communication	needs	to	be	quick	
and	easily	understood	by	colleagues,	employers	and	clients	around	the	world	(Gill	2005:	255).	Chinese	and	
Indians	who	had	studied	in	English-speaking	countries	took	advantage	of	this	because	they	could	not	easily	
enter	domestic	universities	due	 to	special	quotas	for	Malays	(Ishii	1999:	98).	Though	Malays	comprised	
63.1%	of	 the	 total	national	university	 students	 in	1980	 (Sugimoto	2005:	193),	 they	could	hardly	 find	
advantageous	workplaces	except	in	the	civil	service,	which	was	the	largest	employer	of	Malay	graduates	(Gill	
2005:	255).
	 The	most	successful	thing	government	had	done	during	this	period	was	to	recover	political	stability.	The	
UMNO	revised	the	ruling	coalition	to	form	the	Barisan	Nasional	(National	Front)	in	1973,	including	Gerakan	
(based	mainly	on	Chinese),	and	PAS	(Malay	Islamic	party	based	in	rural	areas,	withdrawn	from	the	BN	in	
Table 4. Enrolment in tertiary education (degree course) by ethnic group in local and overseas institutions
1970 1975 1980 1985
total total overseas total overseas	share	(%) overseas total overseas	share	(%)
Malays 3048 8600 5,194 18804 27.6 6034 29875 20.2
Chinese 3752 5373 11,533 18381 62.7 13406 24647 54.4
Indian 559 846 2,676 3928 68.1 3108 5581 55.7
Total 7677 15008 19510 41454 47.1 22684 60522 37.5
Sources:	MP4.	p.351-2;	MP5.	p.490-1;	MTR3.	p.	203.
Table 5. Occupation and profession by ethnic group (%)
Bumiputera Chinese Indian Bumiputera Chinese Indian
Administrative	&	Managerial Accountants
2005 37.1 55.1 7.1 2005 20.8 73.6 4.4
1995 36.1 54.7 5.1 1995 16.1 75.2 7.9
1985 28.0 63.0 5.0 1985 8.6 83.3 6.0
1975 28.1 58.8 7.3 1975 7.7 73.8 8.2
Engineers Doctors
2005 46.0 47.6 5.4 2005 36.7 29.9 26.6
1995 38.1 55.2 5.2 1995 33.4 32.1 32.0
1985 27.0 65.5 5.3 1985 18.0 40.3 38.2
1975 7.5 76.1 10.5 1975 4.4 48.7 38.7
Lawyers
2005 38.0 37.1 24.1
1995 29.0 43.3 26.6
1985 16.4 53.3 24.5
1975 12.8 50.7 35.2
1975, 1965: Peninsular Malaysia only.
Sources:	MP4.	p.59-60;	MP7.	p.82-4;	MP9.	p.334-5;	MTR5.	p.	66-7.
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1978)	in	addition	to	MCA	and	MIC.	The	UMNO	established	a	consultation	system	in	the	BN	in	which	it	paid	
much	attention	 to	Chinese	and	Indians	without	conceding	leading	positions	 to	 them	(Suzuki	2010:	269).	
Through	 this	 process,	 the	UMNO	could	manage	 to	 force	 them	 to	 accept	 the	NEP.	Though	 it	was	
disadvantageous	for	them,	a	significant	number	still	considered	it	better	to	keep	open	a	negotiation	channel	
even	at	large	cost	and	try	to	obtain	as	much	profit	as	possible	through	it	than	to	directly	pursue	equal	rights	
(Tan	1995).	
	 The	UMNO	established	not	only	a	consultation	regime,	but	also	a	repressive	one	by	revising	the	Seditions	
Act	in	1970,	which	prohibited	public	argument	on	sensitive	issues	such	as	the	status	of	Malay	as	a	national	
language,	the	powers	and	status	of	the	sultans,	Malays’	special	rights	and	non-Malays’	citizenship	rights.	With	
such	soft	and	hard	lines	together,	 the	NEP	was	firmly	established,	and	thus,	Malaysian	politics	were	stable	
throughout	the	1970s.
(3)	Mahathir	Regime	before	the	East	Asian	Financial	Crisis
	 In	terms	of	manufacturing,	which	plays	a	principal	role	in	industrialization,	Malaysia	had	been	taking	almost	
a	laissez-faire	approach,	not	protecting	indigenous	enterprises	until	they	gained	sufficient	competitiveness,	as	
other	developmental	states	had	done.	However,	 the	fourth	Prime	Minister	Mahathir,	 inaugurated	in	1981,	
embarked	on	raising	indigenous	manufacturing,	and	this	was	the	beginning	of	authentic	developmental	policy	
in	Malaysia.20）	The	Malaysian	economy	in	this	period	had	faced	the	problem	that	Malays	had	not	yet	obtained	
sufficient	skills	and	knowledge,	while	 their	 rising	wage	caused	by	economic	growth	drove	 the	 labour-
intensive	industry	in	the	corner.	In	response,	Mahathir	planned	to	promote	the	domestic	heavy	industry	with	
many	affiliated	firms	and	diffuse	high	technology	to	them.	The	state-owned	Heavy	Industry	Corporation	of	
Malaysia	(HICOM)	was	established	in	1980	and	included	cement	plants,	 ironworks	and	the	national	auto	
maker	PROTON.	
	 Yet	Mahathir’s	developmental	policy	was	deeply	affected	by	 the	 logic	of	affirmative	action.	Though	
authentic	developmental	policy	should	promote	promising	 industries	 regardless	of	 the	ethnicity	of	 their	
owners,	the	companies	that	were	actually	targeted	were	exclusively	those	owned	by	Malays.	There	were	many	
objections	which	stated	that	for	Malays	to	be	competitive,	‘it	would	be	better	off	to	start	in	small,	purposeful	
steps	rather	 than	make	a	quantum	leap’	(Jesudason	1989:	118),	but	Mahathir	rejected.	 these	claims	 	As	a	
result,	companies	established	under	his	 rapid	promoting	plan	were	 large	but	 inefficient,	 relying	on	 the	
government’s	support.	In	the	end,	they	were	not	so	different	in	character	from	the	non-manufacturing	foreign	
companies	bought	out	by	Malays	in	the	1970s.
	 Thus,	heavy	industrialization	could	not	stop	the	decline	of	the	Malaysian	economy	that	had	been	occurring	
20）	 With	the	“Look	East	Policy”,	Mahathir	recommended	to	learn	about	authentic	developmental	policy	from	Japan	and	other	East	Asian	countries.
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since	the	introduction	of	 the	ICA	in	1975	(Figures	3,	4).	As	long	as	raw	materials	such	as	rubber,	 tin	and	
petroleum	continued	to	have	a	high	price	in	the	international	market,	 the	pursuit	of	Malay-oriented	heavy	
industrialization	could	be	afforded.	However,	once	 the	price	plunged	 in	 the	mid-1980s,	 the	Malaysian	
economy	dropped	sharply,	eventually	to	record	a	negative	growth	rate	in	1985	(Jesudason	1989:	98;	Yasuda	
1988:	164).
	 When	the	resources	to	be	redistributed	are	insufficient,	affirmative	action	brings	about	political	instability.	
Thus,	the	late	1980s	became	rather	turbulent.	In	1987,	after	Mahathir	won	the	presidential	election	by	a	small	
margin,	his	rival	candidate	Razaleigh	Hamzah	withdrew	from	the	UMNO	accompanied	by	many	members,	
and	 the	UMNO	split.	Also	 in	1987,	many	Chinese	were	arrested	under	 the	Internal	Security	Act	 (ISA),	
including	those	who	marched	against	the	appointment	of	a	Chinese	teacher	who	could	not	speak	Chinese	to	
the	position	of	principal	at	a	Chinese	elementary	school.
	 In	order	to	overcome	these	situations,	the	government	weakened	preferential	treatments	for	Malays	and	took	
more	competition-oriented	measures	suited	for	the	international	economy.	Already	since	1983,	many	public	
corporations	had	begun	to	be	privatized	for	the	purpose	of	reducing	government	expenditure	and	promoting	
their	efficiency	(Muthu	2002:	83).	The	Malaysia	International	Shipping	Corporation	(privatized	in	1994),	
Malaysia	Airline	(1994),	and	PETRONAS	are	famous	examples	of	such	privatization.	Malays’	buying	out	of	
foreign	companies	also	slowed	under	 the	Promotion	of	Investment	Act	 in	1986,	and	the	 linkage	between	
foreign	and	indigenous	firms	was	pursued	without	excluding	non-Malays	 in	particular.	Small-to-medium	
firms,	most	of	which	were	Chinese,	were	removed	from	the	stipulation	of	having	30%	shareholding	by	
Malays	 (Fong	1990:	177).	This	was	based	on	 the	political	decision	 that	 ‘even	 the	decrease	of	Malays’	
shareholding	ratio	must	be	admitted,	 if	 the	economic	efficiency	can	be	improved	through	the	competition	
between	Bumiputera	and	Chinese	small-to-medium	firms’	(Yasuda	1988:	172).	
	 Source:	Department	of	Statistics	of	Malaysia
Figure 4. Growth Rate of GDP 1981-96
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Table 6. Ownership of share capital of limited companies by ethnic group (%)
1970＊ 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004
Bumiputera 1.9 9.2 12.5 18.5 19.3 20.6 18.9 18.9
(individuals	&	institutions) n.a. 3.6 5.8 11.3 14.2 18.6 17.2 17.2
(trust	Agency) n.a. 5.6 6.7 7.2 5.1 2.0 1.7 1.7
Chinese
37.4 37.5 44.6
48.2 45.5 40.9 38.9 39.0
Indians 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.2
Foreigners 60.7 53.3 42.9 24.0 25.4 27.7 31.3 32.5
＊	Peninsular	Malaysia	only.
Sources:	MP4.	p.	62;	MP5.	P.107;	MP6.	p.14;	MP7.	p.86;	MP9.	p.336;	MTR2.	p.87.
	 In	education,	human	resources	based	on	the	Malay	language	were	pursued	a	little	less,	and	English-	and	
Chinese-language	educations	were	strengthened.	The	government	permitted	English	to	be	used	in	advanced	
science	and	medicine	classes	in	1994	because	it	could	not	neglect	the	usefulness	of	English	as	a	language	of	
science	and	international	business	(Sugimoto	2005:	133-4).	The	government	also	issued	a	Chinese	education	
plan	in	1988	and	announced	in	1996	that	Chinese	classes	should	be	compulsory	in	all	elementary	schools	by	
2000	(Sugimura	2000:	133-4).	This	was	because	the	government	wanted	to	take	advantage	of	having	35%	of	
its	population	who	spoke	the	same	language	as	the	huge	market	of	China	(Sugimoto	2005:	136)	and	to	utilize	
Chinese	human	resources	who	were	more	equipped	with	science	and	 technology	skills	 than	 their	Malay	
counterparts	(Lee	1999:	91).	
	 Based	on	these	policy	changes,	the	UMNO	tried	to	make	another	political	reconciliation,	and	as	a	result,	
Wawasan	2020	(Vision	2020)	was	issued	in	1990.	It	emphasized	the	concept	of	‘Bangsa	Malaysia’—every	
Malaysian	should	have	equal	opportunity	 irrespective	of	ethnicity—and	aimed	at	Malaysia	becoming	a	
developed	country	by	2020.	Major	ethnic	leaders	could	manage	to	agree	on	it,	and	the	political	turbulence	of	
the	late	1980s	was	alleviated.	
	 After	the	introduction	of	development	policy	with	less	ethnic	preference	and	the	political	re-stabilization,	the	
Malaysian	economy	rose	again	(Figure	4.).	This	was	partly	because	Japanese	factories	making	machinery	for	
export	had	moved	to	Malaysia	owing	to	a	stronger	yen	led	by	the	Plaza	Accord	in	1985.	Taking	advantage	of	
this	economic	surge,	 the	government	again	undertook	large	public	projects	such	as	 the	Multimedia	Super	
Corridor,21）	which	began	in	1996.
	 In	this	period,	Malaysian	policy	came	much	closer	than	before	to	being	developmental,	as	in	other	East	Asian	
countries.	The	state	took	positive	measures	to	protect	promising	firms	without	necessarily	excluding	Chinese	
or	Indian	ones	until	they	grew	enough	to	compete	in	the	market.	Affirmative	action	was	a	little	marginalized,	
working	as	a	conciliatory	measure	to	support	developmental	policy	instead	of	positively	correcting	ethnic	
21）	 This	project	envisaged	to	build	a	huge	high-tech	zone	with	an	optical	fiber	telecommunications	infrastructure	and	to	create	two	new	cities,	
Putrajaya,	the	new	capital	city,	and	Cyberjaya,	the	IT	city	where	advanced	enterprises	are	to	be	agglomerated	(Abbott	2004:	82).
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disparity.	Since	 the	nature	of	Malaysian	affirmative	action	had	always	been	 redistributive	 rather	 than	
promotive,	 the	disparity	would	not	be	corrected	once	the	redistributive	ratio	had	been	loosened.	Thus,	 the	
Chinese/Malay	disparity	would	not	improve	after	it	had	diminished	from	more	than	double	in	the	1970s	to	
about	1.7%	in	the	mid-1980s	(Figure	2).	
(4)	The	East	Asian	Financial	Crisis	and	Afterward
	 Though	Mahathir	had	begun	 to	pursue	a	more	efficient	economy,	 inefficient	policies	still	 remained.	
Privatization	of	public	enterprises,	in	particular,	had	brought	about	the	nexus	between	UMNO	executives	and	
Malay	or	Chinese	conglomerates	rather	 than	fair	competition.	Its	original	objective	was	to	give	shares	of	
public	enterprises	 to	a	 few	promising	entrepreneurs	 to	encourage	 their	competition	and	 thus	make	 the	
Malaysian	economy	more	efficient,	but	in	order	to	avert	the	risk	involved	in	their	business,	each	entrepreneur	
sought	connection	to	a	particular	political	leader	(especially	Anwar	Ibrahim,	Daim	Zainuddin	and	Mahathir)	
to	protect	their	enterprise	by	offering	political	funds;	the	rivalry	between	leaders	led	to	the	sectionalism	of	the	
UMNO	(Gomez	2003,	2004).	
Table 7. Ownership of top 20 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
Company Activity Main	Shareholder
1.	Telekom Telecommunication Government
2.	Malayan	Banking Finance Government
3.	Tenaga	Nasional Power	Producer	&	Distributor Government
4.	Petronas	Gas Gas	Production Government
5.	Resort	World Gaming Lim	Goh	Tong
6.	Malaysia	int.	Shipping	Corp Shipping Government
7.	Sime	Darby Plantations/	Diversified Government
8.	Commerce	Asset-Holding Finance Government
9.	Genting Gaming Lim	Goh	Tong
10.	YTL	Corp Construction Yeoh	Tiong	Lay
11.	Public	Bank Finance The	Hong	Lay
12.	Rothmans	of	Pall	Mall Cigarette	Manufacture Foreign
13.	YTL	Power	International Power	Production Yeoh	Tiong	Lay
14.	RHB	Capital Finance Rashid	Hussain
15.	United	Engineers Construction/	Diversified Halim	Saad
16.	Renong Construction/	Diversified Halim	Saad
17.	Berjaya	Sports	Toto Gaming Vincent	Tan
18.	Magnum	Corporation Gaming (Unclear)
19.	PROTON Car	Manufacturer Government
20.	Kuala	Lumpur	Kepong Plantations
Source:	Gomez	(2003:	87)
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	 The	East	Asian	financial	crisis	in	1997	made	this	problem	more	serious.	A	vast	amount	of	short-term	foreign	
investments	was	flowing	into	the	rapidly	growing	economy	of	East	Asia,	but	it	was	immediately	brought	back	
altogether	once	signs	of	stagnation	appeared.	Owing	to	this,	many	Asian	corporations	fell	 into	default.	The	
IMF	recommended	structural	reform	to	these	countries,	saying	that	restructuring	free	and	fair	markets	and	
correcting	nepotism	and	state	patronage	would	reverse	the	fleeing	of	capital	and	put	the	economy	back	on	a	
growth	trajectory.	However,	Mahathir	rejected	the	IMF	solution,	fearing	that	it	would	also	demand	giving	up	
developmental	policy	and	Malay	privileges.	Instead,	he	denounced	foreign	investors’	selfishness	as	the	cause	
of	 the	crisis.	He	 restricted	 the	capital	overflow	 to	maintain	domestic	 investment	and	 increased	export	
competitiveness	by	cutting	ringgit	down	to	dollar.	As	a	result,	the	Malaysian	economy	shortly	overcame	the	
crisis	to	grow	steadily22）	(Figure	5).	
	 However,	Mahathir’s	actions	also	had	a	bad	result:	large	firms	that	depended	on	their	connection	to	politics	
could	not	recover	from	their	poor	performance.	As	long	as	Mahathir	insisted	that	foreign	investors’	selfishness	
was	the	cause	of	the	crisis,	he	could	not	let	his	cherished	companies	bankrupted	because	of	their	inefficiency.	
Thus,	he	bailed	out	privatized	companies	such	as	Bumiputera	Bank,	 the	DRB-HICOM	group	(a	heavy	
industry	conglomerate),	Malaysia	Airline,	and	the	LENON	group	(a	conglomerate	of	construction	and	others	
companies),	but	this	sponsorship	made	it	all	the	more	difficult	for	them	to	correct	their	inefficiencies.
	 Because	Malaysia	had	become	similar	to	developed	countries,	and	the	East	Asian	economy	as	a	flying	geese	
pattern	had	changed	much	with	globalization,	diversified	demand,	 the	 rapid	growth	of	China	and	 the	
stagnation	of	Japan,	 it	became	difficult	 for	bureaucrats	 to	select	promising	industries	 to	be	supported	by	
government.23）	Selection	through	market	competition	was	becoming	more	effective	than	state	intervention.	
22）	 To	Malaysia’s	response	to	 the	crisis,	“some	prominent	 international	economists	and	financial	analysts	also	gave	their	approval,	however	
grudging”	(Case	2005:	292).
23）	 In	spite	of	this	situation,	telecommunication	enterprises	have	recently	been	targeted	for	encouragement	(Salazar	2004).
	 Source:	Department	of	Statistics	of	Malaysia
Figure 5. Growth Rate of GDP 1997-2009
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This	was	one	of	the	reasons	for	the	struggle	between	Mahathir	and	Anwar,	who	argued	that	more	neo-liberal	
policies	were	suitable	to	overcome	the	crisis.	
	 After	being	ousted	by	Mahathir	in	1998,	Anwar	led	the	‘reformasi	movement’,	criticizing	authoritarianism	
and	nepotism	to	advocate	democracy	and	economic	freedom.	This	movement	gathered	not	only	Chinese	and	
Indians	who	were	disadvantaged	by	Malay	privileges,	but	also	many	Malays	because	‘elite-level	bailouts	now	
diminished	mass-level	prospects,	with	grievance	over	the	government’s	having	drawn	on	worker	savings	in	
the	Employees’	Provident	Fund	(EPF)	swelling	into	an	acutely	felt	sore	point’	(Case	2005:	294).	For	many	
Malays,	the	existence	of	rich	Malays	who	were	favoured	by	the	government	no	longer	meant	a	hope	for	future	
benefit,	but	rather	inequality.	
	 In	 the	latest	general	election	in	2008,	PR	(Pakatan	Rakyat,	 the	People’s	Front),	 the	opposition	alliance	
between	PAS,	DAP	(the	Chinese	socialist-oriented	party)	and	PKR	(The	People’s	Justice	Party	led	by	Anwar)	
won	more	than	one-third	of	the	seats,	dealing	as	serious	a	blow	to	the	ruling	coalition,	as	in	1969.	However,	
the	aims	of	PR	are	obscure.	Though	opposition	parties	can	all	agree	on	democratization	that	eliminates	the	
UMNO’s	authoritarianism	and	clientalism,	there	is	still	disagreement	in	that	PKR	based	on	middle	Malays	
and	DAP	on	middle	Chinese	are	both	market-oriented,	whereas	PAS,	desiring	to	build	an	Islamic	state,	insists	
on	state	intervention	to	redistribute	wealth	to	poor	Malays	in	the	rural	areas.24）
	 The	government	 is	also	fluctuating.	Though	 it	once	rejected	neo-liberal	policies	by	ousting	Anwar	 to	
maintain	developmental	policy	and	affirmative	action,	it	also	recognizes	that	free	market	is	indispensable	for	
economic	growth.	The	New	Economic	Model	for	Malaysia	(NEM)	issued	in	2010	shows	this	fluctuation,	
saying	 that	 ‘the	excessive	focus	on	ethnicity-based	distribution	of	 resources	has	contributed	 to	growing	
separateness	and	dissension’	while	still	holding	the	concept	of	Bumiputera’s	special	rights	and	noting	‘the	
design	of	effective	measures	that	strike	a	balance	between	the	special	position	of	bumiputera and	legitimate	
interests	of	different	groups’	(NEAC	2010:	89).	
Conclusion
	 How	should	Malaysian	policies	be	judged	in	terms	of	the	two	conditions	for	effective	affirmative	action?	
Have	 they	been	able	 to	set	an	adequate	scale	of	quota	 for	Malays	without	evoking	Chinese	and	Indian	
hostility?	Have	they	been	able	 to	establish	a	social	cooperation	scheme	in	order	for	 the	quotas	 to	 lead	to	
Malays’	raising	their	skills,	knowledge	and	credibility?	
	 In	the	former	point,	Malaysia	has	been	rather	successful.	The	scale	of	quota	has	been	varied	time	to	time	to	
accommodate	economic	circumstances.	With	all	its	nepotism,	corruption	and	quasi-democratic	regime,	it	has	
24）	 However,	according	to	one	explanation,	“anti-PAS	sentiment	is	diminishing	even	among	Chinese	because	they	come	to	think	that	PAS	will	
neither	take	power	by	itself	nor	build	an	Islamic	state”	(Shinozaki	et	al.	2008:	88).
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flexibly	constructed	the	consultative	scheme	to	respond	to	non-Bumiputeras’	opinions.	Therefore,	disastrous	
ethnic	conflicts	such	as	the	civil	wars	in	post-colonial	Africa	and	race	riots	in	the	present	European	countries	
have	been	avoided.	However,	as	the	2008	general	election	shows,	people	now	demand	a	more	democratic	and	
transparent	procedure.	To	meet	this	demand,	anti-democratic	laws	such	as	the	ISA	should	be	lifted,	with	the	
awareness	that	a	difference	of	opinion	should	not	lead	to	serious	confrontation,	which	Malaysia	has	avoided	
so	 far.	 It	 is	also	 important	 that	both	 ruling	and	opposition	parties	should	make	clear	 their	opinions	on	
economic	growth	and	ethnic	disparity	once	again,	and	on	the	basis	of	 these	opinions,	seek	to	revise	their	
affiliation	to	form	a	more	transparent	government.	
	 With	regard	to	the	latter	point,	Malaysia	has	been	unsuccessful	throughout	its	history	mainly	because	of	the	
difficulty	of	demarcation	between	developmental	policy	and	Bumiputera	policy.	Ruling	Malays,	essentially,	
should	have	produced	a	flying	geese	pattern	also	in	the	domestic	economy.	That	is,	while	promoting	the	most	
promising	industries	 irrespective	of	ethnicity	 to	 lead	to	rapid	growth,	 they	should	have	tried	to	select	 the	
second	most	promising	sectors	that	held	many	Malay	firms	and	employees	and	made	it	easier	for	them	to	step	
up	to	more	promising	sectors	by	developing	their	skills	and	knowledge	under	the	governmental	support.	
	 However,	the	Malays’	status	as	a	political	majority	had	become	an	obstacle	to	taking	such	a	roundabout	way.	
Eager	to	gain	immediate	results,	 they	paid	more	attention	to	superficial	outcomes	such	as	ethnic	ownership	
than	to	education	and	training.	Therefore,	when	they	noticed	that	such	preferential	 treatments	were	stifling	
economic	growth,	 the	principal	policies	 they	made	 involved	 loosening	 the	preferential	 ratio,	with	 little	
attention	to	changing	the	policies	into	more	promotive	ones.	
	 Bumiputera	policy	produced	two	distinct	types	of	Malays.	One	type	consists	of	many	unskilled	employees	
who,	though	becoming	richer	than	before,	still	have	a	lower	standard	of	living	than	Chinese	and	Indians.	The	
other	consists	of	a	few	rich	business	executives	who	rely	on	their	connection	to	the	government	to	avert	the	
risks	involved	in	their	business.	Less	attention	was	paid	to	raising	Malays	categorisable	between	these	two	
types,	that	is,	encouraging	matured	employees	who	are	willing	to	spin	out	to	establish	their	own	companies	
and	to	gain	skills,	technology	and	credibility	through	their	business	experiences.	
	 In	addition,	 the	government	should	have	taken	greater	charge	of	policies	such	as	promoting	technology	
transfer	by	intermediating	foreign	and	domestic	firms,	guaranteeing	the	quality	of	goods	Malay	small-to-
medium	firms	produced	and	 lending	moderate	amounts	of	money	so	 that	successful	 repayments	would	
increase	their	credibility.	It	was	also	important	to	intermediate	Malay-based	and	English-	or	Chinese-based	
knowledge	more	tightly	in	school	curricula	so	that	Malay	employees	could	work	well	in	firms	where	English	
or	Chinese	was	dominant.	Although	 these	may	seem	to	be	rather	 roundabout	methods,	 if	 they	had	been	
implemented,	they	should	have	corrected	the	disparity	swiftly	and	effectively.
	 However,	because	these	policies	were	not	actually	implemented	sufficiently,	the	economic	disparity	among	
ethnic	groups	remains	wide,	and	special	treatments	have	become	vested	interests	for	Malays	and	jeopardize	
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flexible	 implementation	of	other	 economic	policies.	Yet	with	Malaysia	being	 richer	 than	before,	 the	
government	can	now	afford	 to	 take	 roundabout	policies.	 In	addition,	 since	 the	economic	situation	has	
changed,	more	market-oriented	policies	are	needed,	and	state	 intervention	such	as	Bumiputera	policy	 is	
becoming	more	harmful	 to	economic	growth.	Therefore,	all	special	quotas	not	followed	by	any	particular	
social	cooperation	should	be	abolished	 in	principle,	and	 roundabout	and	promotive	policies	should	be	
implemented	more	intensively.25）	In	response	to	this,	business	executives	who	rely	on	political	connections	
and	many	Malays	who	have	a	less	competitive	spirit	may	feel	discontent,	but	the	feeling	must	be	overcome	
with	strong	leadership	based	on	a	more	transparent	will	formation.
References
Abbott,	 Jason	P.	2004.	The	Internet	and	Democratisation.	Edmund	T.	Gomez	(ed.)	The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, 
Equality and Reform,	London;	New	York:	Routledge	Curzon,	pp.	79-104.	
Akamatsu,	Kaname.	1962.	A	Historical	Pattern	of	Economic	Growth	in	Developing	Countries.	Journal of Developing 
Economies	1(1):	3-25.
Austen-Smith,	David	and	Fryer,	Roland	G.	2005.	An	Economic	Analysis	of	“Acting	White”.	The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics	120(2):	551-83
Baker,	Wayne.	1990.	Market	Networks	and	Corporate	Behavior.	American Journal of Sociology	96:	589-625.
Bates,	Timothy	and	Williams,	Darrell.	1996.	Do	Preferential	Procurement	Programs	Benefit	Minority	Business?.	American 
Economic Review	86(2):	294-7.
Barry,	Brian.	2001.Culture and Equality.	Cambridge:	Polity	Press.
Bernard,	Mitchell	and	Ravenhill,	John.	1995.	Beyond	Product	Cycles	and	Flying	Geese:	Regionalization,	Hierarchy,	and	the	
Industrialization	of	East	Asia.	World Politics,	47(2):	171-209.
Bourdieu,	Pierre.	1985.	The	Form	of	Capital.	J.G.	Richardson	(ed.)	Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of 
Education.	New	York,	NY:	Greenwood,	pp.241-58.
Campos,	 Jose	Edgardo	and	Root,	Hilton	L.	1996.	The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Shared Growth Credible.	
Washington,	DC:	Brookings.
Case,	William.	2005.	Malaysia:	New	Reforms,	Old	Continuities,	Tense	Ambiguities.	Journal of Development Studies, 41(2):	
284-309.
Clark,	Kenneth	B.	1965.	Dark Ghetto: Dilemma of Social Power.	New	York,	NY:	Harper	and	Row.
Damondaran,	Rupa.	2009,	July	22.	Moves	to	set	ideal	investment	climate.	New Straits Times.
Department	Statistics	of	Malaysia.	1971-2008. Yearbook of Statistics Malaysia.	Kuala	Lumpur:	Jabatan	Perangkaan.
Dworkin,	Ronald.	1977.	Taking Rights Seriously.	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press.
Evans,	Peter.	1995.	Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press.
Fishkin,	James	S.	1983.	Justice, Equal Opportunity and the Family.	New	Heaven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press.
Fong,	Chan	Onn.	1990.	Small	and	Medium	Industries	 in	Malaysia:	Economic	Efficiency	and	Entrepreneurship.	The 
Developing Economies	27(2):	152-79.
25）	 We	can	find	the	same	inclination	in	the	New	Economic	Model	for	Malaysia	in	2010,	but	it	is	rather	eclectic,	with	its	principle	obscured.
 161Affirmative	Action	and	Development	
Fryer,	Roland	G.,	Goeree,	Jacob	and	Holt,	Charles.	2005.	Experience-Based	Discrimination:	Classroom	Games.	Journal of 
Economic Education 36(2):	160-70.
Fryer,	Roland	G.	and	Loury,	Glenn.	2005.	Affirmative	Action	and	Its	Mythology.	Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3):	
147-162.
Gill,	Saran	Kaur.	2005.	Language	Policy	in	Malaysia:	Reversing	Direction.	Language Policy 4:	241-60.	
Gomez,	Edmud	T.	2003.	Affirmative	Action	and	Enterprise	Development	in	Malaysia:	The	New	Economic	Policy,	Business	
Partnerships	and	Inter-ethnic	Relations.	Kajian Malaysia 21(1&2):59-104.	
Gomez,	Edmud	T.	2004.	Ownership	and	Control	of	Corporate	Malaysia.	Gomez	(ed.)	The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, 
Equity and Reform.	London;	New	York,	NY:	Routledge,	pp.	157-93.
Government	of	Malaysia.	1965~2010.	First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) ~ Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015),	Kuala	
Lumpur:	Percetakan	Nasional	Malaysia	Berhad.
Government	of	Malaysia.	1969~2009.	Mid-Term Review of the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) ~ Mid-Term Review of the 
Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010),	Kuala	Lumpur:	Percetakan	Nasional	Malaysia	Berhad.
Granovetter,	Mark.	1973.	The	Strength	of	Weak	Ties.	American Journal of Sociology,	78(6):	1360-80.
Haggard,	Stephan.	1990.	Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries.	
Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press.
Holzer,	Harry	and	Neumark,	David.	2000.	Assessing	Affirmative	Action.	Journal of Economic Literature	38:	483-568.
Huntington,	Samuel	P.	and	Nelson,	Joan	M.	1976.	No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries.	
Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press.
Ishii,	Yuka.	1999.	Esunikku Kankei to Hitono Ido [Ethnic	Relation	and	International	Migration	in	Malaysia:	The	Choice	of	
Chinese	Malaysians].	Tokyo:	Kokusai	Shoin.
Jesudason,	James	V.	1989.	Ethnicity and the Economy: The States, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia.	
Singapore:	Oxford	University	Press.
Johnson,	Chalmers	1982.	MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975.	Stanford,	CA:	
Stanford	University	Press.	
Jomo,	Kwame	S.	1986.	A Question of Class: Capital, the State, and Uneven Development in Malaysia.	Singapore;	New	
York:	Oxford	University	Press.
Kasahara,	Shigehisa.	2004.	The Flying Geese Paradigm: A critical study of its application to East Asian regional 
development. UNCTAD Discussion Paper No.169.
Komiya,	Ryutaro,	Okuno	Masahiro,	Suzumura	Kotaro	(eds.)	1984.	Nihon no Sangyo Seisaku	[Industrial	Policy	of	Japan].	
Tokyo:	The	University	of	Tokyo	Press.
Kukathas,	Chandran.	1992,	Are	There	Any	Cultural	Rights?.	Political Theory	20(1):	105-39.	
Kymlicka,	Will.1996.	Multicultural Citizenship.	New	York,	NY;	Oxford	University	Press.
Lee,	Molly	N.	N.	1999.	Education	in	Malaysia:	Towards	Vision	2020.	School Effectiveness and School Improvement,	10(1):	
86-98.
Mahathir	bin	Mohammad.	2008.	The Malay Dilemma	(with	a	new	preface).	Singapore:	Marshall	Cavendish.
Means,	Gordon	P.	1996.	Soft	Authoritarianism	in	Malaysia	and	Singapore.	Journal of Democracy	7(4):	103-17.
Munro-kua,	Anne.	1996.	Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia. New	York,	NY:	St.	Martin’s	Press.	
Murakami,	Yasusuke.	1992.	Shin Koten no Seiji Keizaigaku I, II	[An	Anticlassical	Political-Economic	Analysis],	Tokyo:	
Chuo	Koron	sha.
Muthu,	Rajendran.	2002.	Malaysian Society and Social Welfare: Dilemma of Racial Inequality,	Tokyo:	Akashi	Shoten.
国際公共政策研究  第18巻第 1 号162
National	Economic	Advisory	Council	(NEAC).	2010.	New Economic Model for Malaysia, Part 1,	Malaysia.	
New	Straits	Times.	2002,	August	7.	PM:	Bumiputera	entrepreneurs	too	dependent.	
Onozawa,	Jun.	2010.	Malaysia	no	Shin	Keizai	Senryaku	[New	Development	Strategy	of	Malaysia:	“New	Economic	Model”	
and	“The	Tenth	Malaysia	Plan”].	Kikan Kokusai Boueki to Toushi	 [Quarterly	 Journal	of	 International	Trade	and	
Investment]	81:	38-63.	
Putnam,	Robert.	2000.	Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New	York,	NY:	Simon	&	
Schuster.
Salazar,	Lorraine	C.	2004.	Liberalising	Telecommunications	in	Malaysia.	Edmund	T.	Gomez	(ed.)	The State of Malaysia: 
Ethnicity, Equity and Reform. London;	New	York,	NY:	Routledge,	pp.	194-228.
Shinozaki,	Kaori	et	al.	2008.	BN	Taisei	no	Taiou	(1)	[The	Response	to	BN	regime	(1):	Reforms	Addressed	by	Different	
Ethnic	Groups].	Hiroyuki	Yamamoto	(ed.)	“Minzoku no Seiji” ha Owattanoka? [Does	“Ethnic	Politics”	End?:	The	Report	
and	Analysis	of	the	Malaysian	General	Election	in	2008].	Kyoto:	Japan	Association	for	Malaysian	Studies,	pp.81-8.
Sugimoto,	Hitoshi.	2005.	Malaysia ni okeru Kokusai Kyoiku Kankei	 [Malaysian	Education	 from	an	 International	
Perspective:	Globalization	Impact	on	Education].	Tokyo:	Toshindo.
Sugimura,	Miki.	2000.	Malaysia no Kyoiku Seisaku to Minority	[Educational	Policy	and	the	Minority	in	Malaysia:	Chinese	
Schools	under	the	Policy	of	National	Integration].	Tokyo:	The	University	of	Tokyo	Press.
Suzuki,	Ayame.	2010.	Minshu Seiji’ no Jiyu to Chitsujo	[Liberty	and	Order	in	the	‘Democratic	Politics’:	Re-examining	the	
Political	Regime	of	Malaysia].	Kyoto:	Kyoto	University	Press.	
Tan	Liok	Ee.	1995.	Chinese	Leadership	in	Peninsular	Malaysia:	Some	Preliminary	Observations	on	Continuity	and	Change.	
Leo	Suryadinata	 (ed.)	Southeast Asian Chinese: The Socio-Cultural Dimension. Singapore:	Time	Academic	Press,	
pp.109-36.
Tobin,	James.	1965.	On	Improving	the	Economic	Status	of	the	Negro.	Daedalus 94:	878-998.
Trezzini,	Bruno.	2001.	Embedded	State	Autonomy	and	Legitimacy:	Piecing	Together	the	Malaysian	Development	Puzzle.	
Economy and Society,	30(3):	324-53.
Vernon,	Raymond.	1966.	International	Investment	and	International	Trade	 in	 the	Product	Cycle.	Quarterly Journal of 
Economics	80:	190-207.	
Vogel,	Ezra	F.	1991.	The Four Little Dragons: The spread of Industrialization in East Asia. Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	
University	Press.
Washida,	Hidekuni.	2008.	Malaysia	no	Seito	Senkyo	Data	1955-2008	[Data	of	Malaysian	Political	Parties	and	Elections	
from	1955	to	2008].	Hiroyuki	Yamamoto	(ed.)	“Minzoku no Seiji” ha Owattanoka? [Does	“Ethnic	Politics”	End?:	The	
Report	and	Analysis	of	 the	Malaysian	General	Election	 in	2008].	Kyoto:	Japan	Association	for	Malaysian	Studies,	
pp.171-82.
World	Bank.	1993.	The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. New	York;	Tokyo:	Oxford	University	
Press.
World	Bank.	1997.	World Development Report 1997.	New	York,	NY:	Oxford	University	Press.
Yasuda,	Nobuyuki.	1988.	Bumiputera	Seisaku	to	Kogyo	Chosei	Hou	[Bumiputera	Policy	and	Industry	Co-ordination	Act].	
Horii	Kenzo	and	Hagiwara	Nobuyuki	 (eds.)	Gendai Malaysia no Shakai Keizai Hen-yo [Social	 and	Economic	
Transformation	of	Modern	Malaysia:	18	Years	under	Bumiputera	Policy].	Tokyo:	Institute	of	Developing	Economies,	
pp.139-76.	
Ye,	Lin-Sheng.	2003.	The Chinese Dilemma,	New	South	Wales:	East	West	Publishing	Pty	Ltd.
